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Much educational thinking is goal-directed. This is as it should be, and in keeping with 
education’s traditional self-understanding as a practical, intentional discipline: to bring about 
changes that are considered desirable (and perhaps necessary). Such changes are given in the 
curriculum and commonly called learning, development, knowledge acquisition or Bildung 
and can take place on both individual and institutional levels.  
 To this end, educators have at their disposal theories, methods, techniques, 
experiences, rules of thumb and a host of tacit assumptions about how things hang together 
and work. Typically, goal-directed educational theories involve a more or less clearly defined 
goal, and an account of how to achieve it. The basic idea of any goal-directed theory is that 
the “entity” in question (an individual student, a class, an organization, etc) changes toward 
the goal partly as a function of its interaction with an environment. The tendency toward a 
goal presupposes interaction with a stable environment; if the environment is unstable the 
goal may never be achieved. Consequently one may seek to influence the environment, e.g. 
by stabilizing and structuring it. This is precisely what goal-directed educational theories do; 
they tell us how we should arrange the environment in order to ensure an interaction that will 
further the tendency toward the goal; that is, maximize the probability of attaining the goal. 
Already in 1929 Erich Weniger described the job of what he calls an educational theory “of 
the third degree” as follows: “Bewuβter und systematischer will die Theorie die Praxis 
machen, Rationalität and klare Einsicht vermitteln, die Zufälligkeit des Handelns 
ausschalten” (1990, p.42, emphasis added). Weniger seems to be one of very few 
educationalists who use the term randomness (Zufälligkeit) at all, but we think his views are 
eminently generalizable. Randomness is seen as a problem, as an obstacle, as “noise” in the 
system, as an interfering factor, as something that stands in the way of planning and 
achieving results. Maximizing the probability of goal attainment goes hand in hand with 
minimizing randomness. We shall make it our business in this paper not only to question the 
problematic role attributed to randomness, but also to argue that randomness in fact can be 
seen as a good thing – even, perhaps, as necessary. 
In this endeavor we seem to be going against the current; albeit not alone. In recent 
years, the onslaught on randomness has taken on unprecedented proportions. Worldwide the 
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educational landscape of today is dominated by a vocabulary consisting of such concepts and 
ideas as learning outcomes, evaluation, testing, measurement, qualification, evidence-based 
practice (and policy), employability, accountability, effectiveness, competencies, quality 
assurance and predictability; here given in no particular order. Thus we have a situation 
where learning outcomes are predetermined and stated as precisely as possible, not 
infrequently in terms of competencies and skills. Since schooling and education are 
considered successful when those outcomes have been achieved, outcomes-based education 
makes excessive requirements of assessment, measurement, mapping and documentation. 
There is no room for randomness and interfering factors and “noise” in such processes. If the 
quality and the value of the educational activities come down to achievement of pre-defined 
outcomes, two things might ensue. First, unpredicted outcomes will not be appreciated. 
Second, one can imagine that the range of admissible individual-environment interactions to 
further such outcomes must be narrow and highly specific; thus the environment needs to be 
tightly structured. 
So why is this a problem? Who could be opposed to clearly defined goals and 
maximally effective, carefully evidenced ways of achieving them? Claudia Ruitenberg (2009) 
provides a short but highly lucid account of different critiques of outcomes-based education. 
A pragmatic, based on John Dewey’s conception of educative experiences (to be developed 
in the full paper); a political, coupling measurable outcomes to economic utility and 
productivity; and a conceptual, based on Richard Peters’ views of the concept of education, 
arguing that outcomes-based education is misguided because it narrows education to training 
and instruction and fails to do justice to broader cognitive processes such as e.g. rational 
reflection and appreciation of art. To these critiques Ruitenberg adds an ethical critique, 
using Derrida’s ethics of hospitality to argue that outcomes-based education fails to give 
place to unforeseeable learning and therefore is fundamentally inhospitable. It does not give 
place to students, she argues, but rather predetermines what learning should take place in 
educational spaces.    
While we at least partly share Ruitenberg’s concerns about unforeseeable learning, 
our perspective differs from hers in two ways. She restricts her analysis to outcomes-based 
education; we wish to be more general and principally address all education. Her concern is 
ethical, ours is more, shall we say, metaphysical. We wish to explore randomness as an 
integral part of the make-up of the world. As a prelude we again turn to Weniger. Weniger is 
a subtle and nuanced thinker. While he acknowledges that the job of a (goal-directed) 
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educational theory among other things is to contribute to the organization of practice and 
infuse it with predictability, he also says the following: “Als letztes bleibt schlieβlich die 
Forderung nach Offenheit der Theorie gegenüber der konkreten Situation, es darf keine 
Tyrannis der “praktischen Erfahrung” gegenüber dem jeweils Neuen der erzieherischen 
Aufgabe geben” (1990, p.40, emphasis added). This citation reveals something important that 
we will elaborate much on in the full paper. If our lives were wholly predictable, it would be 
sufficient to use one’s existing knowledge and old experiences as guides to future events and 
actions. Anything new that happened would appear to be old and known; in fact it could 
simply be subsumed under already existing categories. All our theories in some significant 
sense have the past as their major frame of reference. If randomness did not exist, we could 
learn all we ever needed to know by repetition, imitation and memorization. We could tailor 
interactions with an environment that would unfailingly bring about the results we desire. But 
as Weniger suggests, while our knowledge may be a necessary condition for action, it is not 
also a sufficient one. There is always something new, something unpredictable, something 
that is randomly present. The world is contingent. This means that we may find ourselves up 
against things we do not know and are not prepared to handle, and it means that our actions 
may have consequences we did not and could not predict. In Antiquity they used the word 
tyche (τύχη) to denote the unexpected, the random, the unpredictable, luck or unluck. In 
educational settings, we argue, we do our best to eradicate tyche to allow for maximum 
predictability.   
At this junction a couple of questions arise. Is it possible to eradicate all randomness? 
We take the uncontroversial answer to be no, it is not. Is it desirable? Again our answer is no, 
with some qualifications. And since this might be more controversial, a substantial part of our 
paper will go into developing a line of argument to justify our answer. Here we wish to 
invoke the work of Gregory Bateson (1980). He describes learning as a stochastic process. 
This phrase is ambiguous and allows at least two interpretations. The first is that the same 
process yields different outcomes. This does not really interfere with planning, since the 
outcomes may not be random but rather statistically distributed over a given range. It means, 
however, that one cannot predict the outcome for individual students. The second 
interpretation is to see the learner is a stochastic “entity”. In this case the result will be 
genuinely unpredictable and indeterminate and no plans can be made.  
Bateson’s views on learning are complex and belong to a wider system of 
evolutionary theory. Great care is therefore needed in adapting his views to educational 
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thinking. But what he says that is of highest importance to us here is that no organism can 
produce anything new unless it contains some source of the random. Randomness thus 
becomes a necessary but double-edged sword: it can lead to disorder or it can lead to 
innovation. The link to educational theory comes about because the random component is 
provided by the individual in interaction with his/her environment. And here is an interesting 
meeting point of such diverse thinkers as Bateson and Weniger: can we plan for the new? 
Weniger cautions us against rigid thinking, fixating the new in old categories. Bateson says 
we can achieve the new only by embarking on pathways that are randomly present; 
something that cannot be predetermined but is an opportunity to be seized in the moment.  
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